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DEFINITIONS

This section describes a few of the terms used throughout this study that are not necessarily
defined elsewhere.

Basic Input-Output System (BIOS): Information of the computer hardware system and serves as
the intermediary between the hardware and the operating system software of the computer
system (Bonomo et al., 2003).
DD Command: A simple UNIX mechanism used to extract information (Movall, Nelson, &
Wetzstein, 2005).
Dead Forensics: Take place after an incident was detected and confirmed (Grobler, Louwrens, &
Solms, 2010a).
Digital Forensics: The analysis of digital evidence which includes network forensics, computer
forensics, mobile device forensics and malware forensics (Casey, 2011).
Forensic Image: Will contain current files as well as slack space and unallocated space (Vandeven,
2014).
Gigabyte: A measure of storage capacity equal to 1024 megabytes or 1,073,741,824 bytes
(Merrian-Webster, 2017a).
Hardware Write Blocker: a hardware device that attaches to a computer system with the primary
purpose of intercepting and preventing (or ‘blocking’) any modifying command operation
from ever reaching the storage device (NIST, 2004).
Live Forensics: Gathering of live evidence during an ongoing attack (Grobler, Louwrens, &
Solms, 2010b).
Logical Image: Analysis involving using the native operating system, on the evidence disk for a
forensic duplicate, to pursue the data (Easttom, 2014).
MD5 Hash: Algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as output a 128bit "fingerprint" or "message digest" of the input (Rivest, 1992).
Physical Image: Offline analysis conducted on an evidence disk or forensic duplicate after booting
from a CD or another system (Easttom, 2014).

ix
Software Write Blocker: Tool that protect drive access through the interrupt 0x13 BIOS interface
of a PC (NIST, 2003).
Solid-state Drive (SSD): A nonvolatile memory chip using Negated AND gate-based flash
memory, which retains memory even without power (Easttom, 2014).
Terabyte: 1024 gigabytes or 1,099,511,627,776 bytes (Merrian-Webster, 2017b).
Ultrabook: A high-end subnotebook defined by Intel (Intel Corporation, 2012).
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ABSTRACT

Author: Graham, Michael M.S.
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: December 2017
Title: A Comparative Analysis of Forensic Methods Used on a Microsoft Surface Book. Major
Committee Chair: Dr. Marcus Rogers
The research question being asked by this project is which tool is the most effective at dead
forensics and which is the most effective at live forensics when working on time-sensitive cases
that involve a Microsoft Surface Book? The Microsoft Surface series of products is an example of
one of the new products containing a non-removable solid-state storage drive. These laptop
computers are becoming very popular and offer something that most other tablets do not, a full
size USB port capable of transferring data on and off the device. This port can allow connectivity
of many different device and most simultaneously with the help of a hub. This port can finally
allow investigators access to the internal storage of the device. Many techniques were attempted
in order to recover data, however due to time constraints this project only tested a few open source
techniques along with some commercially developed software. This project examined multiple
tools, along with the knowledge and resources needed to perform data recovery. It was found that
the Microsoft Surface Book has some form of encryption being utilized at all times even if the user
has not enabled BitLocker. The only way this project was able to successfully recover data from
the computer was by utilizing FTK Imager on a live system while logged into a profile. This new
knowledge will help digital investigators to more effectively gather data both on-scene and in a
lab environment.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1.

Statement of the Problem

Forensic practices began back in the 1100s. Digital forensics, in relation, has only been
studied since the 1980s (Garfinkel, 2010). The field of digital forensics is a relatively new field
of study when compared to the other forensics disciplines. This field is also evolving at a blistering
pace (Carnegie Mellon University, 2017) It started as computer forensics but soon expanded to
include all types of digital technology. New types of devices are created every year with different
features and different operating systems. Digital investigators have a strong need to discover ways
to obtain forensic images of the newest devices available. Some of the newer devices are tablets
and Ultrabook computers (Shim, 2012). These often feature a touchscreen with no keyboard,
mouse, or removable storage. These devices are typically very thin and light. In order to
accomplish this small footprint, manufacturers have done away with the standard mechanical
storage disks with rotating magnetic media and replaced it with ultra-fast solid-state drives that
plug directly into or are soldered onto the motherboard.
Devices with solid-state storage soldered directly to the motherboard pose a potential
problem for investigators. Some forensic practices would prefer the hard drive to be removed from
the suspect computer when possible and connected to the examination computer through a write
blocker to prevent potentially changing any data on the suspect drive (SWGDE, 2014). This is
simply not possible with the new type of storage. Investigators need to find a way to access a
system and image the storage without being able to physically remove the drive.
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1.2.

Significance of the Problem

This research is important to the digital forensic community because there is a growing
need to obtain vital information as quickly as possible, especially when on a scene of a time
sensitive investigation (Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge, & Debrota, 2006). Critical information
can be found on various electronic devices retrieved from suspects or even good Samaritans
willing to help. This information could help investigators find violent criminals, the possible
location of a terroristic act being planned, or possibly the whereabouts of a child that was abducted
from their parents.
Mobile computing is a market many users have decided to step into and purchase a
tablet/detachable to replace the traditional computer in their homes.

Vendors that have

traditionally been a leader in the laptop market have decided to expand their product lines to
include the detachable (2-in-1) devices consumers have been clamoring for (Eddy, 2016). As
demand for these devices continues to rise, investigators will have to learn how to quickly obtain
information pertinent to an investigation. The research for this thesis set out to discover the
method(s) which can gather all of the sought after data on a computer in order for a digital
investigator to quickly image and search the internal SSD of a detachable computing device in
order to find the critical information needed.
Methods discovered during this research can be adapted to existing forensic methods.
Future computers may contain internal storage, which could be soldered directly to the
motherboard and cannot be removed without damaging other components.
1.3.

Statement of the Purpose

The goal of this research was to determine which forensic tool is the most effective at dead
forensics and which is the most effective at live forensics when working on time-sensitive cases
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that involve a Microsoft Surface Book. For the purposes of this research, the most “effective”
method is determined by which tool can recover most/all of the sought after data coupled in the
shortest amount of time. Multiple tools were examined along with different techniques. The tools
were graded based on their speed as well as accuracy. In the field of forensics, a higher emphasis
must be on evidential integrity and security. It is for this reason the results were graded as follows,
a single point for every second it took to acquire the image. An additional 5 points will be added
for every artifact missed or with mismatched hash values. The points for each tool were be added
up and the lowest score was determined to the be the most effective. The results of these
experiments were used to answer the research question, “Which forensic technique is best suited
for a Microsoft Surface Book in a time sensitive investigation?”
1.4.

Assumptions

There are several assumptions made when designing the methods used in this analysis:
•

Investigations can benefit from digital evidence immediately found on-scene

•

The software write blocking capabilities are working correct to prevent data from being
changed

•

All extractions are performed using forensically sound techniques

•

All ports on the suspect laptop are intact and working to their full capabilities
1.5.

Delimitations

The delimitations of this study include:
•

Time does not allow all possible extraction software to be tested

•

Performance of external hard drives may vary

•

Not all known file types were placed onto the computer for extraction
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•

Only the USB 3.0 interface is available for data transfer
1.6.

Limitations

The limitations of this study include:
•

This study only examined speed and accuracy

•

This study only tested and compared three imaging tools

•

This study only uses a single Microsoft Surface Book
1.7. Summary

This section was written with the intent to shed light on this research project including the
scope, significance, limitations, delimitations, and assumptions. The purpose of this research is to
find the most effective way for cyber investigators to obtain information from the Microsoft
Surface Book computers that feature non-removable storage drives. This is a problem that most
investigators will soon face if they have not already. The hope was to identify a specific tool and/or
technique, which enables the investigator to quickly and accurately find important evidence during
a time-sensitive investigation.
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2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The review of literature performed for this research identified a lack of knowledge as it
pertains to imaging newer style computers without removable media. These types of devices
present new challenges to analysts as they become more and more popular and therefore are more
likely to hold a key piece of evidence during an investigation. It was the purpose of this research
to determine which tools, and techniques are best in time-sensitive situations. The differences
between tools could translate into valuable information being located in a shorter time.
2.1.

What is Digital Forensics?

Forensic practices have occurred starting back in the 1100s. Digital forensics, in relation,
has only been studied since the 1980s. The field started as computer forensics only but soon
expanded to include all types of digital technology. Advances in technology have led to greater
data storage capacity, along with a significant increase in the number of devices each person owns
(Waring, 2014). The increased reliance on electronic devices might also be a contributing factor
to a soaring jump in cybercrimes. Criminals could use digital devices to send threatening emails,
fraudulently transfer money, harass others or conduct other illegal businesses (Lessard & Kessler,
2010). Digital forensics is a division of the forensic community that focuses on the digital world
as a whole. Not only do these investigators perform analysis on home computers, but also mobile
devices, network forensics and even corporate security. Digital evidence is present in most
investigations even if the user(s) are unaware of it (Årnes, 2017). Computers can be the target of
a crime, an instrument used in the commission of a crime, or simply a place where relevant
evidence might be stored (Easttom, 2014). This makes the job of digital investigators a difficult
one to say the least.
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2.2.

Forensic Method

When conducting an investigation on digital devices, it is paramount that one performs
every task with a purpose and documents what they do and why they do it. The Digital Forensic
Research Workshop (DFRWS) has put together a framework for how a digital investigation should
be conducted (Tahiri, 2016). There are six individual levels to the investigation process:
•

Identification

•

Preservation

•

Collection

•

Examination

•

Analysis

•

Presentation

These levels lay the groundwork for a solid investigation that could be used during a
criminal investigation. The identification phase of an investigation is used to determine what
devices are relevant evidence in the case being pursued. For example, an inkjet printer may not
be considered relevant evidence in a network hacking case. The lead investigator will later
determine the relevance. Once relevant devices have been determined, it is best practice to do
everything possible to preserve the evidence in the manner it was found so as not to potentially
disturb any evidence that might be present within the device. Mobile phones that are found
powered on should be left on but isolated from the network (SWGDE, 2013). The collection phase
of an investigation consists of gathering devices from the scene.

Each device should be

photographed in its original position and secured in a manner that follows accepted procedures.
Next is the examination phase, which consists of an in-depth search of the evidence to locate
primary and even secondary evidence that may be hidden on a device. Primary evidence would
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consist of actual files that are being sought after (Casey & Schatz, 2011). Additional evidence
might consist of the metadata relating to the primary evidence. This could mean a forensic image
for computers and physical, logical, and/or file system extractions for cell phones. This gathering
is done in such a way that the evidence is disturbed the least amount possible to limit any changes
that may occur to relevant data (Årnes, 2017). The analysis phase of the investigation will not
only look at the evidence collected but what these files mean (Al-Fedaghi & Al-Babtain, 2012).
Recording the times files were created or when they may have last been accessed is vital to creating
a timeline of the events that took place. Modified, accessed, created (MAC) timestamps can be
used to identify a timeline of events that happened relating to the event in question (Casey, 2011).
The presentation phase is used to present all the evidence in layperson’s terms to an authoritative
figure such as judge or jury. The presentation should include a summary of all the evidence and
explanation of conclusions that were drawn from the evidence.
2.3. Forensically Sound Techniques
The techniques used by examiners need to follow a set of guidelines established by the
forensic community to ensure data is being collected in a manner which maintains its integrity.
The growing use of digital forensics in the court system has pushed for the development of forensic
processes (Mckemmish, 2008). Multiple subject-matter experts as well as local, state, and federal
law enforcement agencies review many of these guidelines.
This research used practices recognized by the digital forensic community as being
forensically sound. Ensuring digital evidence is collected in a forensically sound manner is key to
ensuring the results are consistent and fair. An example of best practice techniques can be found
in the a pocket guide for first responders (Department of Homeland Security & United States
Secret Service, 2007). The disk imaging tools used in this study have been verified by the NIST
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Computer Forensics Tool Testing Program (CFTT) (NIST, 2017). Each case for investigators
feature unique scenarios and challenges that need to be documented and overcame. All of these
documents are used to provide the examiner with guidance on the best way to obtain and secure
digital evidence (Judish, Hagen, Bailie, & Jarrett, 2009).
2.4. Hard Drive Technology
Standard mechanical hard drives have been around for many years. The inner workings
consist of rotating platters which contain data, a read/write head, and a circuit board. These pieces
work together to store data on this nonvolatile media. The platters are coated with a thin layer of
metal which can be magnetized or demagnetized to hold data. As the platters spin around, the
read/write head seeks the desired information on the platters. Depending on how fast the platters
are spinning and how spread out the data is, this could be seen as slowness to the user (Vamsee,
2011).
An SSD is also nonvolatile store media but uses different technology than the standard
hard drive. Unlike the hard disk drive, SSDs contain no moving parts. These drives are made up
of NAND flash memory modules and a controller (Micheloni, Marelli, & Eshghi, 2013). Data is
stored on these modules and is constantly moved around to keep files are contiguous as possible.
The ability to move data at faster speeds gives these drives an incredible performance advantage
(Benusa, Jeganathan, & Schmidt, 2016). A SSD also uses much less power than a standard hard
drive which is ideal for laptop users seeking an extended battery life.
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2.5.

Imaging

When digital evidence is obtained, it is considered best practice to create a duplicate of the
original media and then perform an analysis from the copy (Department of Homeland Security &
United States Secret Service, 2007). Leaving the original intact will ensure its integrity as well as
allow other copies to be made if needed. The copying of the data bit-by-bit is called a forensic
image and includes all slack/unallocated space (Vandeven, 2014). A forensic image is a type of
duplication generally performed using a hardware or software write-blocker which prevents the
original data from being changed in any way. These images can be either a physical image that
captures every single bit of information on a disk or a logical image that will capture only the
active data on the machine. This will be discussed in the next section.
In the early days of digital forensics, tape drives and hard drives were a type of nonvolatile
storage that used magnetic media to storage bits of information. Mechanical hard drives feature
multiple spinning magnetic platters to hold data. A read/write head will search each platter as it
spins in order to deliver the data to the user. Current hard drive sizes can be as large as twelve
Terabytes for 3.5” versions (Western Digital, 2017) and five Terabytes for 2.5” versions (Seagate,
2017). Solid-State Drives (SSDs) use flash memory chips to store data. These chips allow for SSDs
to come in a various form factors and range in capacity from two Gigabytes on up to 60 Terabytes
(Paulsen, 2016).
Digital forensic methods first relied on booting to a preinstallation environment to image
a hard drive in a forensically sound manner (Pollitt, 2010). In more recent years, as technology has
allowed for the widespread use of SSDs in computers. The compact size has allowed
manufacturers to develop laptops that are lighter and thinner than ever before. The new designs of
laptop make it very difficult to remove the storage media, and some might even be soldered onto
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the motherboard. Physically dismantling these types of laptops is a time consuming endeavor
which could risk damaging the storage device and potentially destroying the data stored within it.
SSDs do have a unique property that investigators must fight against. A program in the firmware
of most SSDs will cause data to be written evenly over the entirety of the disk. This means that
some data may potentially be moved around to fill up unallocated space whenever power is applied
to the drive. This technique is referred to as wear-leveling and can cause data to be erased and
those blocks re-written almost immediately (Kumar & Vijayaraghavan, 2015).
2.6.

Types of Acquisitions

Before starting the imaging process of storage media, it is best for the examiner to
determine what type of image will be most valuable for the current situation. A physical image is
one that captures every single bit of information contained on a drive including all of free and
wiped space. This process is much more thorough and generally takes much longer. A logical
image only captures the user data that one would see during normal use of the computer
(Kemmerich et al., 2014). When performing a logical acquisition on a computer system, the tool
does not seek to capture deleted and unallocated spaces of the drive. This can sometimes result in
a faster acquisition, however; it is less thorough than the physical image. A live data acquisition is
used on systems that are currently running and stays running while the image is taken. This data
includes RAM, currently running processes as well as information on the hard drive (SWGDE,
2014b). Lastly, a Targeted file acquisition is one where specific files are requested along with
related files such as LNK files, registry keys, and Jump lists (SWGDE, 2014)
The logical image may be the preferred imaging technique if investigators are working on
a time sensitive case. This method will allow investigators to view the easily accessible
information which may result in a great lead in the investigation. The downside to this method is
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that hidden data won’t be discovered until a more thorough acquisition can be completed in a
laboratory. In these cases, the on-scene examiner might choose to follow the Cyber Forensic Field
Triage Process Model which focuses on finding the vital information in a short period of time
(Rogers et al., 2006). The potentially shorter processing time of a logical image can make a
significant difference in an investigation.
Another decision that needs to be made at the scene of an investigation is whether or not
live or dead recovery will be used. A live forensic image is obtained while the machine remains
powered on. This might be suitable for machines suspected to contain full disk encryption (Brian
Carrier, 2005). A portion of live forensic process also includes gather the information currently
residing in the computer’s memory. This is known as a RAM Dump. This type of acquisition will
seek to extract data from system memory, currently running processes, networking, registry, and
even malware (Gohel & Upadhyay, 2017). Dead forensic recovery requires that all processes be
terminated and the machine be powered down (Bell & Boddington, 2010). If the storage device is
removable, it is then plugged into a write blocker so the data cannot be overwritten.
Finally, once the forensic image is complete, cryptographic hash values are calculated
called MD5 and SHA-256. These hash values are critical to forensic examiners because it helps
them to determine if the copy that was obtained is exactly the same as the original. If even a single
bit of a file is changed, it will result in a completely different hash value being calculated
(Kornblum, 2006). These hash values also help the examiner differentiate between known
operating system files and files created by the user. MD5 hashes will look at all the information
being process and run it through an algorithm producing a 128-bit value. A SHA-256 hash
performs the same procedure but with a different algorithm producing a 256-bit value.
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2.7.

Write Blockers

Write blockers are a set of devices that have been used for many years in the digital forensic
community. The primary goal of a write blocker is to prevent any data on the source drive from
accidentally being changed during the imaging process (Lyle, 2006). It is imperative the data is
not changed during the investigative process even a little bit. The court must feel confident the
investigator used sound forensic technique and the processes used must pass the Daubert Standard
(Easttom, 2014). Even the slightest bit of doubt can render the digital evidence inadmissible
(Goodison, Davis, & Jackson, 2015).
There are two types of write blocker commonly used during investigations. The first is a
software write blocker that uses special software installed on the examination machine. The
software will only allow certain ports on the machine to act in a read-only mode. It does this by
preventing write commands from making it to the disk controller. Specifically, this method uses
the INT13 interrupt at the BIOS level to interpret read/write instructions. The write blocker will
determine if certain commands from an application are allowed or blocked (NIST, 2003). Based
on the result, either the command will be sent to the disk for execution or it will fail immediately
so no more changes can be made to the disk. Most software write blockers can be turned off which
will allow full functionality to return to all ports on a computer. They can also be prone to failure
due to a myriad of reasons. Since the write-blocking procedure relies on the host hardware,
software updates can create compatibility issues. Motherboard and other hardware failures can
result in a failure to interrupt commands (Menz & Bress, 2004).
A hardware write blocker performs the same functions as a software write blocker
however; the write blocking software interacts directly with the application layer and the controller
while the hardware write blocker is a physical piece of equipment that is attached between the
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storage media and the examiner’s computer. It is important that the device has the most up-todate firmware to be compatible with a wide-range of devices. The write blocker will then look at
commands being send to the suspect storage media and prevent modification requests from
reaching the drive controller (NIST, 2004). These write blockers can be portable so they can be
used at the scene of an incident. Portable write blockers can be manufactured to be read-only while
some can be manufactured to be read/write devices (Tableau, 2017).
2.8.

Imaging Software

There are multiple tools that investigators use to image computers. Some of these tools are
commercially made while others are open source. The commercially made tools are created by
for-profit companies which have a vested interest in creating products able to perform above and
beyond others on the market. Open source tools are those created as a collaboration between many
programmers whom work on the source code to improve from its original design (St.Amant &
Still, 2007). The collaborators typically check each other’s work to ensure there are minimal flaws.
2.8.1. Commercial Tools
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) is a commercially built product from AccessData used to create
images and analyze data found on computers. FTK also includes a standalone utility for imaging
media called FTK Imager. This software can be ran from within an operating system or on a flash
drive (FTK Image Lite) (Bone, 2016). FTK has been used by many computer forensic
professionals and cited in many journal articles and court cases for many years. It has also been
tested by the Department of Homeland Security using the Computer Forensics Tool Testing
(CFTT) program (Department of Homeland Security, 2016). This software has been shown to be
a vital piece of software for digital investigations.
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2.8.2. Open Source Tools
Paladin is a free Linux software based on the widely popular Ubuntu. Paladin was created
by Sumuri and features over 100 built-in tools to assist with investigations. Autopsy started life in
2001 as a GUI to TCT and TCTUTILs. A complete rewrite of this system in 2008 has turned it
into what is now seen today (Carrier, 2017). This distribution contains many free forensic tools
built in to help perform both simple and complex tasks even if network connectivity is not
available.
The DD command is one of the oldest digital forensic imaging tools still in use today. This
command is built into the GNU Coreutils package which has been built into Linux, Mac OS X,
and even Windows. It is a command line application that uses several controls and switches to
control exactly how an image of the machine is captured.
The research performed describes a gap in the current knowledge as it pertains to this
computer. The Microsoft Surface Book is a 2-in-1 computer quickly becoming popular with
consumers featuring a non-removable solid-state drive. Research into forensic techniques for this
computer is sparse. This research devised a plan to close the gap in knowledge by using the tools
described above on both a live and a dead system to find which tool can quickly acquire data.
These devices are becoming more and more mainstream, and this will likely be involved in future
cases that investigators encounter. The results of this research will guide on-scene investigators to
choose which tool will work best for them based on the computers discovered during the search
as well as the state of those computers. Choosing the correct tool will help to expedite the search
for valuable data.
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3. METHODOLOGY

The goal of this research is to determine which tool is the most effect at dead forensics and
which is the most effective at live forensics when working on time-sensitive cases that involve a
Microsoft Surface Book. The research is broken into four different steps to accomplish this task.
1. The first step was to start with a computer that has a fresh installation of Windows 10.
This was done to delete any previous data so as not to taint the results of the
acquisitions.
2. Next, the computer was populated with data that might be found on an everyday homeuse computer.
3. The next step was to complete both live and dead forensic acquisition using the tools
described later. A live acquisition sought to gather all the data a dead acquisition would
gather along with all currently running processes, open files and any other data residing
in RAM. The tools were measured by their speed and consistency of data acquisition.
4. Finally, the measured data was analyzed to determine how the tools performed in timesensitive situations.
3.1.

Configuring the Computer

First, the Microsoft Surface Book needed to be setup with a clean image downloaded
directly from Microsoft and pre-populated with data. The pre-population of data will help to
determine the accuracy of the different imaging software being used. To start, a suitable computer
for this research is a Microsoft Surface Book with an Intel Core i5-6300U 2.40GHz CPU, 256GB
SSD and 8GB of RAM. The Surface Book received a complete erase and reimage with Windows
10 Professional 64-bit Creators Update. After the reimage process was complete, a local user
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account named “Criminal” was created. This account is the sole administrator account. A second,
standard, user account “Son” was also created for more data to be populated. Both accounts have
a separate and unique password. This sought to see if there was a different between administrator
and standard user accounts. Next, all current patches and updates were installed.
After the test profiles were created, they were populated with the files found in the
Appendix A. The data populated in both accounts were mostly downloaded from various sources
on the internet, some files were manually created. The data consisted of MP3 files, PDF
documents, Word documents, images, videos, and html links as these are some of the most popular
file types found on a consumer’s computer (Garfinkel, 2007). After the Surface Book setup was
complete, the user data was populated by creating word documents, downloading MP3, MP4 and
image files from multiple sources on the internet. Also, PDF files were copied to the machine from
a flash drive. Once all data was populated, the storage location of the data was noted. In addition,
an MD5 hash was calculated for each individual file as well as the overall system so this could be
compared to the hashes of the files and image captured during the subsequent acquisitions.
3.2.

Gathering Forensics Image

Ten total acquisitions were ran for each tool as well as for each method to establish a
reliable baseline for length of time needed for each acquisition. All ten acquisitions were compared
to each other for consistency. This will provide an accurate average for how each tool performs
under the given circumstances. Due to these computers having non-removable storage, the hard
drive could not be removed and the imaging software must use the Surface Book’s hardware to
run. The imaging software was delivered via USB 3.0 thumb drive to maximize speed. The
imaging software being tested in this research was chosen due to their popularity and vetting from
the Department of Homeland Security.
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Table 1 Imaging Software
Tool

Version

FTK Live Imager

3.4.3.3

Paladin

7.0.2

Autopsy

4.4.0

DD

7.2.641

These tools were used to conduct both live and dead forensics. The live forensics were conducted
with the computer turned on and logged into the administrator account.
Mouse

yboard

••••••••••
•••••• •••
••••••••••

Externa l Hard Drive
Suspect Compulcr

Figure 1 Workstation Setup
The equipment was setup as seen in Figure 1 above. The researcher could now begin the
actual imaging of the machine. Due to the unavailability of drivers within the Linux kernel, a USB
hub had to be utilized for the keyboard to work properly. This was done based on initial
observations while attempting to perform dead acquisitions using the Paladin boot drive.
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To obtain a “forensically sound” image of the suspect drive it is best to follow the steps
laid out by the Scientific Working Group of Digital Forensics (SWGDE, 2014).
Step 1: The forensic software was loaded onto a 64GB USB 3.0 flash drive. The external
keyboard, mouse and flash drive were plugged into one of the USB ports on the left side of the
computer using a USB hub.
Step 2: For the dead forensic scenarios, the computer needed to boot from the USB flash
drive. To boot to the flash drive on a Surface Book the researcher must hold the volume-down
button, followed by a press and release of the power button.
Step 3: The image being created was added to an 8 terabyte external hard drive that is
connected to the other USB 3.0 port to maximize speed.
One may notice there is no hardware write blocker being used in this process, this is
because the storage media cannot be physically removed from the device. A hardware based writeblocker is used for just that, preventing write commands. In this scenario, a write command is
necessary from the USB stick to run the forensic software. While the forensic software is running,
it will need to be able to write to the external hard drive used to the capture the acquisition. In these
cases, a software write blocker is implemented to prevent any unauthorized changes from taking
place on the suspect system. During the imaging process, a time will be kept to determine how
long each tool took to complete the imaging task.
The process described above was used to acquire images using the software in table 1. First
was FTK Live Imager on a live system followed by the DD command. The remaining tools were
not designed to be used on a live system therefore the researcher was unable to test them at this
point. Once complete, the computer was shut off and booted to the flash drive containing a bootable
image of Paladin. From this flash drive, Paladin, FTK Imager, and the DD command were able to
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be ran. After further inspection of the Autopsy software, it was determined this software used the
DD command to perform imaging. Since this process was already tested there was no need to retest. The start and end times of each acquisition were also recorded for later comparison.
3.3.

Analyzing the Images

The images obtained throughout the processes described above were analyzed and
compared in speed and accuracy to determine which software/process is best for certain situations.
Each image was processed using FTK Toolkit. FTK examined the images and laid out the file
system in use along with all the user data collected within its respected location. First the images
were divided into a “Dead” or “Live” category based on the status of the system when the image
was obtained. As explained earlier, a dead system is one that is powered off and booted to the
forensic software to create the image while a live system is one that is already powered on and the
image much be created without shutting the system down for fear of losing any data. All data
within the “Dead” category was compared against all other data in that same category. The same
was done for the “Live” category.
Within each category, the number of artifacts collected was compared to the original
artifacts to ensure all possible data was captured. The images were also analyzed for the length of
time it took to obtain the image. The size of the image was taken into consideration when
determining the amount of time. Lastly, the times from the dead acquisitions were compared
against each other and the times from live acquisitions were compared against each other.
Another way these images were analyzed is how well each tool was at recovering some/all
of the data populated on the computer. After the data was first placed on the computer, an MD5
hash was calculated and recorded into a chart. Each tool was repeated ten times on a live machine
and ten times on a dead machine. There was a total of 50 acquisitions obtained for this research.
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The hash values for the complete images were also recorded. The data populated onto the machine
was attempted to be located and a hash of that file was recorded and compared to the original hash
value obtained earlier. Any change in the hash values may indicate the data was modified in some
way or only partially captured. The way in which the data was changed might not be obvious or
relevant.
This process continued for all artifacts placed on the machine using both sets of images
from each technique. The hashes were placed into a table for easy comparison to determine which,
if any, files were modified between being placed on the machine and the first image, or between
the first image and the second image.
Once all the data was collected and analyzed, the hope was to have a clear distinction
between the different tools and techniques being used. Perhaps there are situations that a certain
tool with a certain technique is better than others. The data also told us if data is changed during
the imaging process with these new computers. A modification of the data would need to be
accounted for when presenting the finding to a court of law.
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4. RESULTS

The test profiles were created on the computer according to the procedures outlined in the
methodology section. The results of the testing procedures are grouped by the test cases. The live
acquisitions were chosen to be ran first. If a computer is discovered in the on state in the field, it
is best to leave it turned on in accordance with SWGDE Best Practices (SWGDE, 2014). Once a
computer has been turned off, it can never be returned to the state it was found. While still turned
on, the computer was examined and data was collected using the tools described above.
4.1. FTK Imager
4.1.1. Live Acquisition
FTK Imager Lite was downloaded and placed onto the 64GB USB 3.0 flash drive. An MD5
hash was taken of the flash drive before any acquisitions took place. The computer was then logged
into using the known password. The program was executed and a logical acquisition was
performed of the OS partition. The data was captured on a Western Digital 8TB external hard
drive. As explained earlier, each acquisition was ran ten times to obtain an adequate sample of the
performance from each tool.
The results of the ten acquisitions showed that FTK Imager Lite took an average of 2,850
seconds or 47 minutes and 30 seconds to complete each acquisition. All acquisitions were exactly
244,191 MBs in size. The average speed of this tool was 89.2MB/s. A table with all data can be
found in Appendix B.
Once all acquisitions were complete, they were added into FTK Toolkit to be processed as
evidence. Analyzing of each acquisition took place using FTK Toolkit v5.3.3.9. FTK was able to
locate all of the populated data in the location it was placed as shown in Appendix A. MD5 hash
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values calculated by FTK were exact matches to the MD5 hashes calculated before all acquisitions
were started. The length of the file, in bytes, was also a match to the original state. The overall
MD5 hash of the separate images were all unique with no repeats. This suggests the TRIM feature
is working and changing operating system files, but not the user data files that were populated onto
the device. Lastly, an MD5 has was taken of the flash drive afterwards to ensure no new data had
been placed on the flash drive. The hash file matched the original value showing that no data on
the flash drive was changed during the acquisition.
4.1.2. Dead Acquisition
The dead acquisition was performed using FTK Imager Command Line for Linux. This
was downloaded onto a flash drive that contained a bootable image of Paladin. A bash script was
created that would output the start time of the acquisition, then use OS partition at the input and
output the resulting image to the external hard drive as an e01 file. Lastly the finish time of the
acquisition was output in the terminal screen. This script was repeated ten times in a row using a
For loop.
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#!/bin/bash
INPUTDEV="/dev/nvme0n1p4"
for i in {1..10}; do
echo "-----------------------------------";
echo "Time started: $(date)";
echo "Running: FTKIMAGER if=$INPUTDEV
FTK_Dead_Image$i"
time /ForensicsApps/Imaging\ Tools/ftkimager $INPUTDEV
/media/WD/FTK_Dead_Image$i --e01
echo "Time ended: $(date)";
echo "-----------------------------------";
done

Figure 2 FTK Bash Script
The results of the ten acquisitions showed and average time to complete of 3,192 seconds
or 52 minutes and 12 seconds. Each acquisition was 243,631 MB in size. Average speed of the
acquisition was 76.32 MB/s. A table with all data can be found in Appendix B.
Analysis of the dead FTK images was unsuccessful. FTK Toolkit was unable to process
any of the ten acquisitions. All acquisitions contained an unknown file system.

24
4.2. DD Command
4.2.1. Live Acquisition
To obtain a live acquisition using the DD command, dc3dd was downloaded onto the flash
drive and ran from a command prompt using a batch file. In the command string, E:\ referred to
the flash drive and D:\ referred to the external hard drive used for data capture. This file allowed
the acquisition to run ten times without interaction, with the only change being the output file
name.
@echo off
echo %DATE%%TIME%
e:\dc3dd.exe if=\\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 of=d:\DD_Live_Image.dd
echo %DATE%%TIME%
timeout /t 300
echo %DATE%%TIME%
e:\dc3dd.exe if=\\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 of=d:\DD_Live_Image2.001
echo %DATE%%TIME%
…
echo %DATE%%TIME%
e:\dc3dd.exe if=\\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 of=d:\DD_Live_Image10.001
echo %DATE%%TIME%
Figure 3 Batch File
The average time to acquire an image of the drive was 15,335 seconds or 4 hours 15
minutes and 35 seconds. Each acquisition was exactly 256,060 MBs in size. The average speed of
creating the image was 16.70 MB/s. A table with all data can be found in Appendix B.
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FTK Toolkit recognized the file system as having BitLocker encryption and asked for a
security key despite not having configured BitLocker during the setup of the device. None of the
images were able to be examined for artifacts.
4.2.2. Dead Acquisition
The dc3dd utility is built into the Paladin image. Similar to the FTK Dead acquisitions, a
bash script was created to use a For loop to capture ten images right after one another. The script
displayed the start and end time of the acquisition and copied the OS partition as a .dd file.

#!/bin/bash
INPUTDEV="/dev/nvme0n1p4"
for i in {1..10}; do
echo "-----------------------------------";
echo "Time started: $(date)";
echo "Running: dd if=$INPUTDEV of=/mnt/DD_Dead_Image$i.dd"
time /usr/bin/dc3dd if=$INPUTDEV of=/media/WD/DD_Dead_Image$i.dd
echo "Time ended: $(date)";
echo "-----------------------------------";
done

Figure 4 DD Bash Script
The average time to capture an image of the dead system using the DD command was 1,396
seconds or 23 minutes and 16 seconds. This was by far the fastest tool. Each acquisition was
exactly the same size at 255,465 MBs. The average speed per acquisition was 183.39 MB/s. A
table with all data can be found in Appendix B.
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Analysis of these images was unsuccessful by FTK Toolkit, Autospy, and EnCase. None
of the tools were able to read the file system present in the images. It was noted that each image
did have the exact same MD5 hash.
4.3. Paladin
4.3.1. Live Acquisition
Paladin is a modified Linux distribution based off Ubuntu. It was designed to be a bootable
ISO that must be initiated during the startup of a machine. This will not allow live acquisitions to
occur using Paladin. If a computer is found at scene already powered on, this tool is not advised
to be used.
4.3.2. Dead Acquisition
When booted to Paladin on a flash drive, the user is presented with several forensic tools.
One of the tools built into this distribution is the Paladin Toolbox. This utility includes a disk
manager which allows mounting partitions in read or read/write status. There is also a disk imager
that allows for the imaging of partitions using different file formats.
When first performing the acquisitions, the ending file format was set to .e01. This resulted
in an average time of 5,834 seconds or 1 hour and 37 minutes and 14 seconds. Each image was
exactly 255,465 MBs in size. The average speed of acquisition was 43.84 MB/s. A table with all
data can be found in Appendix B.
Upon seeing how long the .e01 images took, the researcher also conducted acquisitions
using the DD format to determine if image creation was any faster. When using the DD format,
the average time for an acquisition was 2,045 seconds or 34 minutes and 3 seconds. Each image
was the exact same size as the .e01 counterpart. This made the average speed 126.25 MB/s.
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During the examination of the images, it was found that FTK Toolkit could not read the
images themselves and therefore was unable to process the information. The file system was
unrecognized and did not show any useful information.
4.4. Autopsy
Autopsy was unable to be used at all during these experiments. After starting the
experiments and performing more research it was determined that Autopsy could only be used in
a bootable format. It was also found that the only way to image a drive using Autopsy was to
simply use the DD command. Since this technique has already been tested, there was no need to
attempt using this tool.
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5. DISCUSSION

This study analyzed data collected from using different forensic tools to obtain live and
dead acquisitions from a Microsoft Surface Book. It sought to determine which tool and technique
would be preferred in a time sensitive investigation. The tools were judged on their speed and how
accurately they recover the data placed on the machine. The tools used in the study included FTK
Imager, Paladin Toolbox, Autopsy, and the Linux DD command.
Each tool was to be tested both with the computer in a live acquisition as well as a dead
acquisition. The times of each acquisition was recorded and an average per tool was determined.
The averages were compared to find which tool was able to successfully copy the hard drive of
the Surface Book onto an external hard drive. While the computer was in a live state, only two of
the tools were able to be utilized. FTK Imager and the DD command were the only tools of the
four that were able to be ran on a live system. Between those two tools, FTK Imager was the
quickest. FTK Imager was able to transfer at 89.2 MB/s, creating an image in 47 minutes and 30
seconds. The Linux DD command ran at a speed of 16.7 MB/s, creating an image in 4 hours 15
minutes and 35 seconds.
The analysis of the live acquisitions was done with FTK Toolkit. The images obtained via
FTK Imager were processed and all files placed on the machine during setup were recovered with
matching MD5 hash values. The total size of each file (in bytes) was also compared to the original
file and all were a match. The comparisons were done by exporting the results into Microsoft Excel
and then comparing the MD5 and size columns.
When attempting to analyze the DD live images however, FTK determined the volume was
locked by BitLocker and requested a BitLocker password before being able to process the image.
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Since BitLocker was never configured on this computer, the password was unknown and
processing did not complete. The image was also attempted to be read by Autopsy and Encase.
Both tools were unable to recognize the file system. This was leading to the belief that even though
BitLocker had not been configured during the setup process, some sort of encryption was enabled
on the machine.
When performing the dead forensics, all acquisitions were performed from a bootable
Paladin USB drive. FTK was a command tool downloaded from AccessData’s website and DD
was included as part of the Ubuntu distribution in which Paladin is based on. The FTK and DD
tools were each ran ten time consecutively using a bash script. This allowed for automation of
these tasks. Paladin was ran manually and the output file name was changed between each
acquisition. After doing some more research, it was determined that the Autopsy tool used the DD
command for imaging. Since the DD tool was already being tested on its own, the researcher opted
not to test this tool.
The DD command was the fastest tool when performing dead acquisitions. The average
time took just over 23 minutes to capture an image of the 255GB operating system partition. This
was the fastest time among all tools dead or live. One item that was noted for all dead acquisitions
was the MD5 hash. The hash value for all 30 acquisitions were exact matches.
When it came time to analyze the dead acquisitions, none of them were able to be read by
any of the tools. Each tool could not recognize the file system present within the images that were
obtained. As this was found to be true with all of the images, they were double checked for
encryption by using WinHex v19.3 to view the information contained within the file. All
information in WinHex appeared to be obfuscated. This further suggests that some type of
encryption was being used on the partition being imaged. Upon further searching of the images
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using WinHex, a volume header of “-FVE-FS-“ was discovered. This volume header is known to
be used by BitLocker (Shabana Subair, Balan, Dija, & Thomas, 2014). These findings can be used
to develop a process for on-scene investigators to follow when a Microsoft Surface Book is
discovered.
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Figure 6 BitLocker Volume Header

5.1. Recommendations
The data from this study showed interesting evidence that may lead to the belief that
encryption is always being used on a Surface Book without explicitly configuring BitLocker.
Another aspect that could have been improved upon in this study would be keeping the operating
system up-to-date. During this study, Microsoft released its Fall Creator’s Update. Microsoft also
recently released their second generation of Surface Book.
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Another change in which could have made was using a version of Ubuntu/Paladin that has
a more up-to-date kernel. The updated kernel contains the drivers necessary for the keyboard, and
touchscreen of the Surface Book to work properly when booted to the Linux distribution. The
ability for the keyboard to work would eliminate the need for a USB hub to be used. The USB hub
could have been a source of bottleneck despite being listed as USB 3.0 speeds.
At the end of this research it is believed that encryption is always being utilized on this
computer. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) built into the Surface Book is thought to be the
reason the hard drive is encrypted based on the presence of BitLocker volume headers (Arthur,
Challener, & Goldman, 2015)
5.2. Summary
This study examined several tools used by the forensic community. It looked at how fast
and how reliable these tools are at gathering data from a Microsoft Surface Book. These tools were
attempted in both live and dead scenarios. Although not all of the tools were able to perform under
both conditions, the results show that only one of the tools was able to successfully recover and
process the data populated onto the machine.
Of all the tools tested, FTK Imager and the Linux DD command were the only tools that
were able to be used on both live and dead machines. FTK Imager used on a live machine was the
only scenario that was able to process and recover the sought after information. The remaining
tools and scenarios were unable to be processed after the acquisition was complete. Based on the
results of processing all the scenarios, it appears that some form of encryption is being utilized on
the machine.
These findings are significant for forensic investigators. It establishes that a password is
needed to gain access to the operating system in order to obtain an image of this machine. This
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will allow for collection of data from the machine which can be immediately examined on-scene
or at a later time back at a lab. Complete disassembly of the Surface Book can be a timely endeavor
and may not be practical when working on a time-sensitive case.
Future work on this topic can include using several other tools that may be better able to
handle any encryption that may be in use on the machine. When using Linux as a bootable tool,
ensuring the kernel is new enough to include Surface Book drivers will help to eliminate the USB
hub that was utilized in this study. This researcher is interested to know if removal of the internal
SSD will yield the same results as the dead acquisitions.
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C:\Users\Son\Documents

Daily-ScheduleItineray-Template-MSWord-Free-Download

C:\Users\Son\Documents

demo

.DOCX

B7509036448A02DBFF1F25A874A2B509

1,333,090

C:\Users\Son\Documents

easychair

.DOCX

BB79B79504CB1032CE76C3A355F4C718

2,204,407

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Event-Planning-

.DOC

7B9C86049F82D5825C9032557A807022

39,424

.DOCX

251BF71F8C34D6A7A239013B2F4FEE21

44,200

Itinerary-Template
C:\Users\Son\Documents

Free-Download-MSWord-Free-ItineraryTemplate
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C:\Users\Son\Documents

Free-MS-Word-Format-

.DOC

E6C1E7C9F80918943029A2FCB99F855C

539,648

.DOCX

8CFAFBA63325439AAA36455A8080260F

107,266

.DOC

A934B321295DC1BAFE2BE3BA2F616B7C

34,816

Travel-ItinerarryTemplate
C:\Users\Son\Documents

Free-Word-Kick-offPlanning-ItinerarayTemplate

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Georgia_opposition_NA
TO-Eng-F

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Georgij Lesnikov - CV

.DOC

F08934C6DF1CED750E345C24663F9C51

67,584

C:\Users\Son\Documents

imrtemplate

.DOCX

4CFC49E973F2E124FC9A4256B1DAB45F

35,947

C:\Users\Son\Documents

mastersinstructions

.DOC

904FDF0C702A1E6A320B9E1511505227

218,112

C:\Users\Son\Documents

MS-Word-2010-

.DOC

4A166A47BC0A3B6E4460088F77D9BB23

28,672

Format-WeddingItinerary-Template
C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (21)

.PDF

232A3F09AC6662BB944434156A488147

2,817,749

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (22)

.PDF

649BFF6038F1DC3A421FAD60E2AEE834

448,583

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (23)

.PDF

6FCE936F1687DC7481E27D95EC63DE0F

30,963,393

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (24)

.PDF

03AC2D82C0EC034BB46DAB3AA13F3E07

1,872,709

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (25)

.PDF

C10187B5680E5B5DB91E2EC0A1485FE5

262,234

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (26)

.PDF

3C62B475903CC8F37278438149E6A046

397,654

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (27)

.PDF

567D99BEBAC52C43C8C7EDED17DA8CFA

6,782,631

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (28)

.PDF

E2DC57B9DB873EF3AD7CB9D29F3BE698

642,486

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (29

.PDF

DC111D8ED66F400B3C0B917DBA011BEE

443,604

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (30)

.PDF

98A56D2AABF0D4FC34D8445F0CE6F4AD

410,991
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C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (31)

.PDF

769A1A43A7C4C9AC8C25FE27C74D0E99

82,187

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (32)

.PDF

B8C50F725598479D355438C633C595EC

961,152

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (33)

.PDF

ED94016BD46025D58AC8087211BBFA16

84,002

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (34)

.PDF

2C313A108912AAD1FF3D4B11B8EF90E1

315,488

C:\Users\Son\Documents

PDF (35)

.PDF

10F6F97E3A4C2F638F422FCBD9275E21

429,366

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Picture12

.JPG

D76EAC902FC1F1EDAFAE8E96995502C7

13,153,160

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Picture13

.JPG

A64280C516588130C8FD0BDCE06D7443

5,482,981

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Picture14

.JPG

2F9D6ACC608BB6C948667E3643404586

6,479,629

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Picture15

.JPG

08F78220547BC5AC56439F56FA4CACDF

6,956,283

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Picture16

.JPG

F977F913F9B7232BFEDE6EE5601C005B

1,059,406

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Picture17

.JPG

126A26619A30226CD90691B04D06D569

208,836

C:\Users\Son\Documents

Picture9

.JPG

B35075835732ACD6EB31F58619134108

188,303

C:\Users\Son\Documents

SampleDOCFile_100kb

.DOC

4198FB827362BBB68A72498100B5D7BD

102,400

C:\Users\Son\Documents

SampleDOCFile_200kb

.DOC

4BE15CC6978DE204946CB161C3D18AA9

204,288

C:\Users\Son\Documents

SampleDOCFile_500kb

.DOC

8E98658AEE1D90B81B313C90A3BC161F

512,000

C:\Users\Son\Downloads

Picture10

.JPG

EE4A5C0132FC1477F4D099F9D840F50D

71,106

C:\Users\Son\Downloads

Picture11

.JPG

D1974CAB58A9AA7C338BE6342D7A1684

4,920,723

C:\Users\Son\Music

01 Don't Stop Til You

.MP3

B61BFC4422EC506B559DA4A99E3162AA

3,798,643

Get Enough
C:\Users\Son\Music

01 Life Is a Highway

.MP3

E2FBC53814E95DC99E75E8E1CBC1B4F2

6,654,597

C:\Users\Son\Music

02 Rock With You

.MP3

DCBE33971D49BE299A7955763809E332

3,553,379

C:\Users\Son\Music

03 Billie Jean

.MP3

C2F5D8D82BFC73306A5703F398C370F8

4,713,105

C:\Users\Son\Music

03 Let's Stay Together

.MP3

C9B9454EB717BE87323A5776D3483EB3

8,051,495

C:\Users\Son\Music

04 Beat It

.MP3

D22AC0D5FFF1F948340C6EE5627D78E9

4,152,653
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C:\Users\Son\Music

05 Thriller

.MP3

DF2AECEF713C49456EC63D64A91A3A24

5,003,745

C:\Users\Son\Music

08 Can I Take You Out

.MP3

1E7BB14D2EDC139704D48A97C9D3D8ED

5,484,224

.MP3

40835D5282272E68389D2588DB02078A

4,683,332

Tonight
C:\Users\Son\Music

11 Bless The Broken
Road

C:\Users\Son\Music

11 Wagon Wheel

.M4A

8EA26C046FC44EB37C92DB37717E0CB3

7,653,866

C:\Users\Son\Music

Good Morning

.MP3

67420E56058DE68276D679ECC09FD8FB

3,417,901

Beautiful
C:\Users\Son\Music

Hot Blooded

.MP3

7705AE88AD643D0419020A2E5B5A2DEA

4,227,512

C:\Users\Son\Music

I'm Moving On

.MP3

4E4D88833AAEF49209B454C7E6CF7E1D

3,920,309

C:\Users\Son\Music

Purple Rain

.MP3

5D1F2B2BA4C7DC7FECC56D834CB50621

8,391,532

C:\Users\Son\Music

Raspberry Beret

.MP3

D86D285912EB94EC65CF8F29D6901EEF

5,127,099

C:\Users\Son\Music

REO Speedwagon -

.MP3

B2E9DD78AA9195BAFC94CBE494603044

11,931,898

.MP3

495F463AFDDB2E708C446FF5E787F294

8,302,778

Can't Fight This Feeling
C:\Users\Son\Music

REO Speedwagon Keep on Loving You

C:\Users\Son\Music

Royals (Lorde Cover)

.MP3

B48D2861A949945B1ACE756602491C24

4,394,675

C:\Users\Son\Music

Shawn Mendes - Mercy

.MP3

B68FF817BC22EACC5A7F51B89258709D

8,551,484

C:\Users\Son\Music

When Doves Cry

.MP3

07AC62F4BDA130DA63B6A44148C63BDB

5,021,057

C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture1

.JPG

F243273AD06A2CBD364A4DBCB2952C37

43,083

C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture18

.JPG

E964E2F1E586F7218A379D232064D078

4,246,360

C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture19

.JPG

A5E8CD2F4034E18CBD96DACB2026B9E7

11,294,874

C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture2

.JPG

2FC453DA4CE077F7E267627FBC780D93

61,079

C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture20

.JPG

DFD793866107345F28C260A7BEBB30F5

100,710
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C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture3

.JPG

B1A1C8B2FA705DDA31AF2797FB137F73

84,627

C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture4

.JPG

C3FA51424D509C245528C5AF1920A5E0

55,397

C:\Users\Son\Pictures

Picture5

.JPG

409623732172EED6F06072CA2219C19B

269,776

C:\Users\Son\Videos

2017 Solar Eclipse

.MP4

4F4DD3BEA187FEA05250CCD77C2D190E

10,204,034

C:\Users\Son\Videos

250,000 Dominoes -

.MP4

2F0819100349541B2757876A718E029F

78,833,749

.MP4

AB208BED4EBB11101E19E0E8F3D76346

56,876,233

.MP4

49D8902C4D1DDE438DD2646103F54FD4

90,763,861

.MP4

EB55D662E36BAD679777F7C77825C4BB

240,684,926

.MP4

33071F4A34065389C81FB12F5340F7B7

220,319,571

.MP4

D3F41CAF77F18112CFA4770B9D71309F

266,783,650

The Incredible Science
Machine GAME ON!
C:\Users\Son\Videos

3 Weird Alarm Clocks
Never Buy This

C:\Users\Son\Videos

CASH or TRASH 10
Strange Chinese Items!

C:\Users\Son\Videos

How To Make A
FIDGET SPINNER Out
Of CAKE It Actually
SPINS! Yolanda
Gampp How To Cake It

C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special
Victims Unit - S14E14 Secrets Exhumed - 480p

C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special
Victims Unit - S14E16 Funny Valentine - 480p
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C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special

.MP4

FE2F1D1E69B3B61325E195CC6138F05F

242,532,520

.MP4

3BDA37BB0E889CB35F94B964828EE4C9

267,961,010

.MP4

0BD2706BB4EA430270B813E83D053B13

249,887,303

.MP4

727D397DBC83C6FDB474E939ED83BB94

251,713,017

.MP4

900B1BD01B764EC390B7EBC04C81BD1B

261,991,282

.MP4

7454A6B5592EBBC3AE54496176A85AB9

297,222,843

Victims Unit - S14E18 Legitimate Rape - 480p
C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special
Victims Unit - S14E23 Brief Interlude - 480p

C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special
Victims Unit - S15E06 October Surprise - 480p

C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special
Victims Unit - S15E07 Dissonant Voices - 480p

C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special
Victims Unit - S15E13 Betrayal's Climax 480p

C:\Users\Son\Videos

Law & Order Special
Victims Unit - S16E18 Devastating Story 480p
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C:\Users\Son\Videos

Light Balance Glowing

.MP4

A377FDD2C29562AE755A470E901A3385

9,523,265

.MP4

48BC61D39915DB69B519D8A0A67D9DF1

44,076,694

.MP4

EFDAC3A86FC3679815F7D56A3029A660

115,611,689

Batman Begins

.MKV

F4752A55ED0AFE744996ED33A5BDABBF

17,298,012,145

The Dark Knight Rises

.MKV

878BCF0AFC769DA37282066842A042EF

22,901,816,449

The Dark Knight

.MKV

BA5EDB6BB96793EE2CE7956B8F004B29

18,488,834,169

Dance Crew Illuminates
the AGT Stage America's Got Talent
2017
C:\Users\Son\Videos

World Record Edition
Dude Perfect

C:\Users\Son\Videos

You Will Laugh Till
You FART - World's
FUNNIEST
Compilation

C:\Users\Son\Videos\The Dark
Knight Trilogy
C:\Users\Son\Videos\The Dark
Knight Trilogy
C:\Users\Son\Videos\The Dark
Knight Trilogy
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APPENDIX B: ACQUSITION RESULTS

FTK Imager Live Acquisition Results

Name

Start
Time

End
Time

FTK_Imager_Live.001

11:18:42

11:57:38

FTK_Imager_Live2.001

14:14:39

FTK_Imager_Live3.001

MD5 Hash Value

Total Time
(sec)

Total Size
(MBs)

Total Speed
(MB/s)

ef63c355c3e05ac4ec447315ee37544f

2,336

244,191

104.53

14:57:48

338f9cc45eb69ca9cfd8139ee54ad7a2

2,589

244,191

94.32

6:42:01

7:44:54

7cd41c1b8280b06a525020158bad2ab0

3,773

244,191

64.72

FTK_Imager_Live4.001

10:01:57

10:41:03

22174acc79ffc7b4a0f04e025fd71e7e

2,346

244,191

104.09

FTK_Imager_Live5.001

11:21:14

12:04:54

7d820966ce4ac7ce30a45555f534b367

2,620

244,191

93.20

FTK_Imager_Live6.001

15:55:29

16:58:15

1498aac5be1cc9e3a25ebec3f829bd9b

3,766

244,191

64.84

FTK_Imager_Live7.001

18:08:54

18:47:59

5927320a64b533b778663b2de25b4516

2,345

244,191

104.13

FTK_Imager_Live8.001

19:27:23

20:10:56

bb9c8c7f8c6fa0406ccb4dc1bd9b8ae6

2,613

244,191

93.45

FTK_Imager_Live9.001

4:24:47

5:27:39

c69cb682c3862a894e2abb3e7174b3fa

3,772

244,191

64.74

FTK_Imager_Live10.001

8:17:01

8:56:04

923028bdd5ed1ebf29e45aa6bcb443be

2,343

244,191

104.22

2,850

244,191

89.22

Averages
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FTK Imager Dead Acquisition Results

Name

Start
Time

End
Time

FTK_Imager_Dead1.e01

7:25:01

8:17:39

FTK_Imager_Dead2.e01

8:17:39

FTK_Imager_Dead3.e01

MD5 Hash Value

Total Time
(sec)

Total Size
(MBs)

Total Speed
(MB/s)

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,158

243,631

77.15

9:10:12

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,153

243,631

77.27

9:10:12

10:02:50

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,158

243,631

77.15

FTK_Imager_Dead4.e01

10:02:50

10:55:57

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,187

243,631

76.45

FTK_Imager_Dead5.e01

10:55:57

11:49:01

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,184

243,631

76.52

FTK_Imager_Dead6.e01

11:49:01

12:42:14

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,193

243,631

76.30

FTK_Imager_Dead7.e01

12:42:14

13:36:40

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,266

243,631

74.60

FTK_Imager_Dead8.e01

13:36:40

14:30:02

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,202

243,631

76.09

FTK_Imager_Dead9.e01

14:30:02

15:23:29

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,207

243,631

75.97

FTK_Imager_Dead10.e01

15:23:29

16:17:05

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

3,216

243,631

75.76

3,192

243,631

76.32

Averages
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DD Command Live Acquisition Results

Name

Start
Time

End
Time

MD5 Hash Value

Total Time
(sec)

Total Size
(MBs)

Total Speed
(MB/s)

DD_Live_Image.dd

8:07:12

12:22:06

488b51198be45e65d9831d80567c0eed

15,294

265,060

16.74

DD_Live_Image2.dd

12:27:06

16:42:22

0d41a8f6687f311883660d25dB69b5ab

15,316

265,060

16.72

DD_Live_Image3.dd

16:47:22

21:03:21

3163bc05203fec74639455e3398cd938

15,359

265,060

16.67

DD_Live_Image4.dd

21:08:21

1:24:42

371cf2e7a7a6c3201413570db68b025d

15,381

265,060

16.65

DD_Live_Image5.dd

1:29:42

5:46:08

4e3946d293730d130498561def03c8fd

15,386

265,060

16.64

DD_Live_Image6.dd

5:51:08

10:06:54

6789eb905c4b94149e0fe5a00f0669ac

15,346

265,060

16.69

DD_Live_Image7.dd

10:11:54

14:27:04

3b8cbc6c765e26847eeacae15a0956c9

15,310

265,060

16.73

DD_Live_Image8.dd

14:32:04

18:48:09

3852442b0d18d21dec1129bdf61cd259

15,365

265,060

16.67

DD_Live_Image9.dd

18:53.09

23:07:53

ba7093e38556ac1c4e8695e855ab213b

15,284

265,060

16.75

DD_Live_Image10.dd

23:12:53

3:28:04

badf767e4e07b3aa30519ee6d67d7176

15,311

265,060

16.72

15,335

265,060

16.70

Averages
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DD Command Dead Acquisition Results

Name

Start
Time

End
Time

DD_Dead_Image.dd

16:02:22

16:27:56

DD_Dead_Image2.dd

16:27:56

DD_Dead_Image3.dd

MD5 Hash Value

Total Time
(sec)

Total Size
(MBs)

Total Speed
(MB/s)

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,534

255,465

166.54

16:49:49

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,313

255,465

194.57

16:49:49

17:12:00

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,331

255,465

191.93

DD_Dead_Image4.dd

17:12:00

17:34:29

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,329

255,465

189.37

DD_Dead_Image5.dd

17:34:29

17:54:09

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,360

255,465

187.84

DD_Dead_Image6.dd

17:57:09

18:20:08

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,379

255,465

185.25

DD_Dead_Image7.dd

18:20:08

18:43:23

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,395

255,465

183.13

DD_Dead_Image8.dd

18:43:23

19:06:56

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,413

255,465

180/80

DD_Dead_Image9.dd

19:06:56

19:30:48

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,432

255,465

178.40

DD_Dead_Image10.dd

19:30:48

19:54:29

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,451

255,465

176.06

1,396

255,465

183.39

Averages
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Paladin Dead Acquisition Results

Name

Start
Time

End
Time

Paldin_Dead_Image.e01

21:41:05

23:23:55

Paldin_Dead_Image2.e01

23:27:05

Paldin_Dead_Image3.e01

MD5 Hash Value

Total Time
(sec)

Total Size
(MBs)

Total Speed
(MB/s)

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

6,170

255,465

41.40

1:04:02

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

5,817

255,465

43.92

5:17:20

6:57:25

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

6,005

255,465

42.54

Paldin_Dead_Image4.e01

6:58:57

8:40:16

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

6,079

255,465

42.02

Paldin_Dead_Image5.e01

16:05:09

17:39:38

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

5,669

255,465

45.06

Paldin_Dead_Image6.e01

17:43:20

19:22:35

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

5,955

255,465

42.90

Paldin_Dead_Image7.e01

19:31:06

21:07:18

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

5,772

255,465

44.26

Paldin_Dead_Image8.e01

22:55:14

0:30:59

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

5,745

255,465

44.47

Paldin_Dead_Image9.e01

2:08:00

3:39:41

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

5,501

255,465

46.44

Paldin_Dead_Image10.e01

7:21:21

8:55:11

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

5,630

255,465

45.38

5,834

255,465

43.84

Averages
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Paladin Dead DD Acquisition Results

Name

Start
Time

End
Time

Paldin_Dead_Image.dd

14:27:27

14:56:51

Paladin_Dead_Image2.dd

15:26:44

Paladin_Dead_Image3.dd

MD5 Hash Value

Total Time
(sec)

Total Size
(MBs)

Total Speed
(MB/s)

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,764

255,465

144.82

15:56:52

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,808

255,465

141.30

16:09:18

16:40:15

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,857

255,465

137.57

Paladin_Dead_Image4.dd

17:20:33

17:52:25

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,912

255,465

133.61

Paladin_Dead_Image5.dd

17:53:04

18:25:55

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

1,971

255,465

129.61

Paladin_Dead_Image6.dd

18:49:25

19:23:31

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

2,046

255,465

124.86

Paladin_Dead_Image7.dd

19:24:33

19:59:44

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

2,111

255,465

121.02

Paladin_Dead_Image8.dd

20:00:54

20:37:47

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

2,213

255,465

115.44

Paladin_Dead_Image9.dd

20:38:37

21:17:20

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

2,323

255,465

109.97

Paladin_Dead_Image10.dd

21:28:29

22:09:18

d1101102219d5dae5f01da2391e00e6c

2,449

255,465

104.31

2,045

255,465

126.25

Averages
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